Dong Hee Lee  Michael Bujold  Young-ki You

10.18399/acta.2010.13.2.007

aporia value-based argumentation sadan ch’ilchŏng (四端七情 four beginnings and seven emotions) insim tosim (人心道心 human mind and moral mind) i’il punsu (理一分殊 one principle and its manifoldness) ki’il punsu (氣一分殊 one energy and different shapes) uju ilgi (宇宙一氣 holistic ki of the cosmos) naturalness of ki ki’s power of life tamil ch’ŏnghŏ (澹一淸虛 clearness of original ki)

This study analyzes the philosophical aporia which was exposed during the debates that developed amongst Neo-Confucianists during the Chosŏn era, whose positions were based on the philosophical theory of the Zhu Xi School of Thought. Of these various debates, the present study focuses on the discussion amongst the four scholars on the topic of Sadan ch’ilchŏng (四端七情, four beginnings and seven emotions)—which includes the debate over the notion of insim tosim (人心道心, human mind and moral mind)—and the arguments over Im Sŏngju’s theory of yugiron (唯氣論, ki-holistic Cosmology). The debates between Yi Hwang, whose penname was T’oegye, and Ki Taesŭng, whose penname was Kobong, saw Yi Hwang establish a moral theory while Ki Taesŭng argued about the structural facts around the functions of the heart or mind (心, sim). To this end, Yi Hwang introduced a moral argument, or axiological statement, in the form of the theory of sach’il hobal (四七互發論, the mutual arising of the four beginnings and seven emotions), a theory which was in turn based on notions such as those of sadan ibal (四端=理發, the four beginnings arise from principle (li)) and ch’ilchŏng kibal (七情=氣發, the seven emotions arise from material force [ki]). On the other hand, Ki Taesŭng opposed Yi’s theory, arguing that Yi’s dualistic presentation could lead to further misunderstanding. For his part, Yi Yi, whose pen name was Yulgok, inherited Ki’s perspective in his own debates with Sŏng Hon (penname Ugye). In this regard, Yi Yi argued that Yi Hwang’s theory of sach’il hobal was wrong in that while the seven emotions (ch’ilchŏng) represented the totality of human emotions, the four beginnings (sadan) were special emotions that nevertheless fell under the category of human emotions. On the other hand, Yi Yi asserted that the human mind (insim) and moral mind (tosim) were in fact interconnected, and could be mutually interchanged with one another (終始, chongsi). However, the theory of the mutual interchange between insim-tosim (終始論, chongsiron) presented as a counter-argument to the theory of the mutual arising of the four beginnings and seven emotions (sach’il hobal) can be likened to a value-based argumentation, or moral argumentation. This was certainly contradictory, and also represented a case of philosophical aporia. This situation originated from the fact that Zhu Xi’s Thought was perceived as a thought based on natural law formed in the medieval period without a proper division of values and facts. In his discussions about the role of human nature (inmulsŏng) in Zhu Xi’s cosmological theory of li-qi (理氣論, principle and material force),1 Im Sŏngju whose penname was Nongmun, emphasized the fact that Zhu Xi’s notion of liyi fenshu (理一分殊, universality and particularity) was representative of the universality and particularity that existed in all the myriad of things found in the cosmos. Im possessed a perspective of cosmology (nature) which regarded the universe as being filled with ki (holistic ki of the cosmos). Im believed that while the ki (material force) of the universe moves naturally by itself, the power of life (生意, saengŭi), or what could also be referred to as the vitality of life (生命性, saengmyŏngsŏng), was involved within ki itself. As a result, Im believed that Zhu Xi’s notion of li (理, principle) was in effect unnecessary. Meanwhile, based on the original condition of material force or energy, Im identified ki (material force) as the clearness of original ki (澹一淸虛, tamil ch’ŏnghŏ). However, as ki is not static, what we are in fact seeing is the clearness vs. unclearness of ki (淸濁粹駁, ch’ŏngt’ak subak). Therefore, the original condition of ki can be perceived as little more than a form of philosophical demand. Furthermore, Im argued that i’il punsu (理一分殊, one principle and its manifoldness) was the same as ki’il punsu (氣一分殊, one energy and different shapes), and that as such the possibility could not be ruled out that Zhu Xi’s liyi fenshu (理一分殊) was in fact based on the premise of qiyi fenshu (氣一分殊). As the concept of li (理) indicates principle and ki (氣) originally indicates material force, i’il punsu (理一分殊, one principle and its manifoldness), which under the religious-philosophy of the medieval period meant sharing in the divine, is more correctly perceived as li. However, as a close relationship exists between li and ki within the metaphysical category, one cannot fully deny the veracity of the notion of ki’il punsu (氣一分殊, one energy different shapes). This is the philosophical aporia of Zhu Xi’s li-qi theory that served as the religious philosophy (metaphysics) of the Medieval Era.