

## LIES, RUMOURS AND SINO-KOREAN RELATIONS: THE PSEUDO-FUJIANESE INCIDENT OF 1687

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In 1687, a man calling himself Yu Yölli was discovered begging from the common people of Chido garrison in Chölla Province by pretending to be a Chinese castaway. Although the Chosön court eventually established that he was lying, it took a full month to come to this conclusion, despite what seems at times to have been a very flimsily constructed identity on Yu's part. This article argues that he succeeded because he effectively reproduced the established Ming Loyalist narrative of the Chosön court, and also because of his initial location in the unstable and uncertain world of the southwestern islands. His lies, for this reason, are very useful for understanding the ideological presuppositions of late Chosön society.

Keyword: Chosön, Maritime China, Chölla, rumour, Ming Loyalism, castaways

In 1687 a man who called himself Yu Yölli 劉連里 travelled about Chido garrison (Chido-jin 智島鎮)<sup>1</sup> in Chosön Korea's Chölla Province using his status as a Ming loyalist migrant to beg from the local people. Ultimately he was taken into custody by the governor of Chölla Province, who then transferred him to the Border Defence Command (Pibyönsa 備邊司). The hook by which Yu had begged from

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<sup>1</sup> The island Chido proper is currently part of Sinan-gun in South Chölla Province.

his victims had been his claim to be a Chinese castaway from Fujian. Yu maintained this claim even after he was taken into custody. Surprisingly, for a time the Chosŏn court appeared almost as credulous as the peasants of Chido garrison, entertaining Yu's story for far longer than one would expect. Seemingly this swindler, the peasants of Chido garrison, and the Chosŏn officials all shared the language of loyalty to the fallen Ming (1368–1644) and hostility to the Qing empire (1644–1912) that had taken the Ming capital of Beijing in 1644 and had completed its conquest of China in 1683, four years before the incident.

This article will explore this shared language of Ming Loyalism by focusing on two different but connected aspects. On the one hand, much of late Chosŏn Ming Loyalism was fictional to the extent that it relied on a narrative constructed through misinformation and baseless rumour. Between Chosŏn's submission to the Qing empire in 1637 and the 1683 collapse of the last Ming successor polity in Taiwan, the Chosŏn court had no direct access to the Ming empire or its later successor states, and depended on informal channels for communication, including Chinese castaways on its coast and non-officials met during diplomatic missions to Beijing. In turn, Chosŏn's own contribution to the Ming Loyalist cause did not pass far beyond private expressions of dissent against the Qing empire. Yu Yŏlli's swindle, in this sense, was successful in part because it participated in a narrative of Chosŏn Ming Loyalism that was itself constructed of fictions.

Moreover, Yu Yŏlli's swindles occurred in a borderland region of the Chosŏn state, facing the uncontrolled Yellow Sea. Chido and the smaller islands in its vicinity, like other islands off the coast of Chŏlla province, were forbidden legal settlement during late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn, but were nevertheless settled by impoverished people and tax dodgers, especially during the seventeenth century. It was only in 1682, a few years before the case of Yu Yŏlli, that Chido and nearby islands were brought under the formal administration of the Chido naval garrison. Although not an official zone of contact with foreigners, it was effectively a border region that was only under the weak control of the state. The success with which Yu operated for a time in this region reveals a frontier region that was notably open to Chinese castaways. Yu, although a run-of-the-mill criminal, produced a narrative of Ming Loyalism that was comprehensible to both poor island peasants and Chosŏn court officials, and also revealed the role of ordinary people in the construction of this ideology.

## 1. THE INTERLOPER WHO WASN'T

The *Veritable Records of Sukchong* (*Sukchong sillok* 肅宗實錄) mentions the affair of the pseudo-Fujianese only once and very briefly, informing us, in its entry for the

second day of the fifth lunar month of 1687,<sup>2</sup> that “a man from Chōlla Province falsely claiming to be a Chinese castaway from Fujian called Yu Yōlli<sup>3</sup> transformed his speech to confuse the people, and wandered begging among the villages. When this matter became known, he was brought under control. When the truth was established, he was dealt with according to the law.”<sup>4</sup>

The description in the *Veritable Records* suggests an uncomplicated case—a criminal was brought to justice by a competent Chosŏn court concerned to protect the people from fraud. Yet the more detailed account in the *Records of the Border Defence Command* (*Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 備邊司謄錄) reveals the image of order and justice presented in the *Veritable Records of Sukchong* to be misleading. Far from being brought under the control of the state for swift justice, Yu caused considerable confusion for the relevant Chosŏn officials for some time after his arrest, and it was only with considerable difficulty, involving an investigation lasting almost a full month, that they established that he was not who he claimed.

Initially the Chosŏn court treated him as what he claimed to be, a Chinese castaway. Indeed, the date of the entry in the *Veritable Records*, the second day of the fifth month, is also the date of the first encounter between the central court and Yu Yōlli, who had previously been simply a matter of local concern. On that day, the *Records of the Border Defence Command* merely states that Yu had just been transferred to Hansŏng, the royal capital, from Chōnju, the provincial capital of Chōlla, to be investigated by the Border Defence Command with the help of interpreters with a good command of Chinese. Because he was assumed to be a Chinese castaway, Yu was treated well, both fed and protected from encounters with random people,<sup>5</sup> in accord with the general principle that people from distant lands should be properly cared for.<sup>6</sup> On the next day, during interrogation, Yu claimed to the interpreters that he had landed with Gao Ziyīng 高子英 (a real castaway who had arrived in 1681)<sup>7</sup> in Chido garrison in Chōlla Province. When asked why his name was not included in the list of the living and dead in Gao

<sup>2</sup> All months referred to in this article are, unless otherwise noted, the months of the lunar-solar calendar then current in Chosŏn Korea.

<sup>3</sup> As is made clear both in this passage in the *Veritable Records* and in later sections of this article, Yu Yōlli was Korean and not Chinese, and could not in fact speak Chinese properly. For this reason, here and throughout, I will render his name according to Korean pronunciation as opposed to Mandarin or Southern Min.

<sup>4</sup> *Sukchong sillok* 18:23a [1687. 5. 2].

<sup>5</sup> *Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 41:40a [1687.5.2].

<sup>6</sup> Concerning the usual treatment of castaways in the late Chosŏn, see Chōng Sōng’il, *Chōllado wa Ilbon: Chosŏn sidae haenan sago pūnsōk* [Chōlla Province and Japan: Marine accident cases during the Chosŏn period] (Seoul: Kyōng’in munhwasa, 2013), 361–381.

<sup>7</sup> *Sukchong sillok* 12:7b [1681.8.7].

Ziying's ship, he merely pointed towards his chest, indicating sickness, and when asked where he had been for seven years, he said he had been in the mountains and then pointed to his head, seemingly suggesting that he had concealed himself as a monk.<sup>8</sup>

Yet hints of the fraudulent nature of his Chinese identity became apparent. The interpreters “who spoke Chinese well” found Yu incomprehensible, and Yu was barely able to maintain a full sentence in Chinese:

His language is hard to understand, and he mixes [his Chinese] speech with Korean speech and pronunciations. Although we repeatedly tried to understand him, in the end we were unable to make his speech out. Therefore, we will report only that which we could understand.<sup>9</sup>

His pronunciation itself seemed forced:

We asked him where he had lived and he said Fujian 福建 province—but he said this in Korean pronunciation [*Pokkōn*]. .... At times he would, weeping, point towards the southern sky, and say things that could not be clearly understood.<sup>10</sup>

Yet they charitably suggested that:

After being pushed off-course, he arrived on the island and, after wandering about begging in the mountains, he seems to have gained the ability to understand our language—but cannot speak it himself. His original language seems to have been a dialect from deep within Fujian, and because his language is different, even the more skilled of our interpreters cannot understand him. We suggest that he be moved to a quiet place to live in one room with two of our interpreters to observe his actions and listen to his speech and perhaps through this understand the reality of his story.<sup>11</sup>

The difficulties in Yu's story extended beyond language. For instance, the

<sup>8</sup> *Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 41:40b [1687.5.3]: “問前日漂到人高子英所傳生死人中，何以無汝姓名，則但指胸間，以意推解，似稱有病而落後，問七年之間，栖止之處，則稱以山間，以手撫頭，似是依僧行乞之狀。”

<sup>9</sup> *Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 41:40a [1687.5.3]: “則其言語侷，雜以本國語音，及反覆抽繹，終不能解聽，但就其可解者言之。”

<sup>10</sup> *Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 41:40a [1687.5.3]: “問其居住，則稱以福建，而此則以本國音傳說 ... 有時悲泣，手指南天，口稱不詳。”

<sup>11</sup> *Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 41:40b [1687.5.3]: “則漂到之後，流落島嶼，轉乞山間，似解本國之言，而語不可了，其本來語音，則似是福建深處土音，而與話有異，雖解語譯宜，亦不能諗得，若移置靜處，使一二譯官，與之同處，察其動靜，聽其言語，或可以究得本末。”

investigators soon pointed out serious contradictions in Yu's claim to have arrived with Gao Ziyang. Yu claimed to be from Fujian, but Gao in fact departed from Suzhou. Gao claimed to have been travelling from Suzhou to Shandong, but Yu claimed that he had been sailing for the purpose of trade from Fujian to Southeast Asia and had been blown off-course.<sup>12</sup> However, even these serious contradictions did not convince the Border Defence Command that Yu was a swindler. Rather, on the sixteenth of the fifth month, two weeks after the beginning of the investigation, they decided to have him sent to China with a group of Nagasaki-bound Chinese traders who had come ashore at Cheju, and in the meantime sought to vigorously investigate a man, Pak Ip 朴立, with whom Yu claimed to have stayed.<sup>13</sup> On the same day they had Yu interviewed in the presence of the very group of Nagasaki-bound Chinese traders he was to accompany to China. Because the castaway sailors were from a large number of provinces in China, it was thought that one at least would understand Yu, should he in fact be using an obscure dialect from some region of Fujian. It was soon established that nobody understood Yu. Zhang Wenda 張文達, the leader of the group of Chinese traders, claimed that Yu "was clearly not a man of China," while the suspicion of the court was increased by the fact that Yu showed considerable signs of fear.<sup>14</sup> The interpreters themselves noted that he spoke almost entirely in Korean, and used only a few words of Chinese.<sup>15</sup>

The officials in this case saw this as confirming that Yu was not Chinese, and so could not possibly be sent to Beijing. Surprisingly, this did not settle matters. In appearance, it was argued, he did not seem Korean. In fact, they continued to interview people implicated by Yu, including Chin Kiun 陳起雲, an interpreter, as well as the aforementioned Pak Ip from Chido. Pak Ip admitted that his father had put up someone who he believed to be Chinese (in fact, he stated that three foreign castaways had come to the island), but his description of events only confirmed part of Yu's story.<sup>16</sup>

Extraordinarily, despite the confirmation of Yu's non-Chinese status on the sixteenth, the governor of the Chōlla Province, Yi Yu 李濡 (1645–1721), still considered it possible that Yu had come from China. Thus, on the twenty-seventh, nearly a month after the initial investigation by the Border Defence Command, Yi

<sup>12</sup> *Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 41:41a–41b [1687.5.9].

<sup>13</sup> *Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 41:49b [1687.5.16].

<sup>14</sup> *Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 41:51a [1687.5.16]: "即招全州押來劉姓人者，使之接話，則各省之人，會坐一處，各其方語，多般詰問，則彼此之語，頓無相通，文達等曰，回顧職等拍掌而笑，曰：「此人決非中原之人也，若非風癩者，必是貴國之人，何以謂中原之人。」而使俺等以之接話耶，蓋聽衆人之言，則非但一無相通，劉漢氣色，惶口失措，顯有戰慄之狀，的非漢人，斷可知矣。"

<sup>15</sup> *Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 41:57a [1687.6.1]: "問答之際，皆用我國之語，而漢語則或發一二句語，亦不能慣熟。"

<sup>16</sup> *Pibyōnsa tūngnok* 41:57b–58b [1687.6.1].

suggested, on the basis of Pak Ip's description, that Yu had actually sailed from Dengzhou 登州 in Shandong province with another castaway called Zhang Yunshou 張雲守.<sup>17</sup> To support this, Yi reported that Yu had said during the original interrogation in Chönju that he had come from Dengzhou in Shandong province.<sup>18</sup> On the first day of the sixth month, the officials in charge asked Yu if he had come to Chosŏn in Zhang's ship, but Yu said that he had not.<sup>19</sup> Otherwise, although the brief reference in the *Chosŏn Veritable Records* describes Yu Yŏlli as having been punished according to the law, the precise punishment is not specified in the otherwise much more detailed *Record of the Border Defence Command*. However, the *Newly Supplemented Collection of Royal Edicts* (*Sinbo sugyo chimnok* 新補受教輯錄) of 1743 includes a royal edict of 1687 which was clearly issued in response to the incident: "Those who change their name and surname, and fraudulently pretend to be Chinese castaways, thus confusing villagers and deceiving the state, should be punished with beheading in accordance with the punishment for the one who had falsely claimed to be the Yodong-baek 遼東伯,<sup>20</sup> whom the office of interrogations ordered to be beheaded without waiting for the proper season."<sup>21</sup> This punishment was then also integrated into the *Amended Great Code* (*Soktaejŏn* 續大典) of 1746,<sup>22</sup> although without the explanatory reference to the precedent of false claims to the title of Yodong-baek.

## 2. MING LOYALISM, RUMOURS AND CASTAWAYS

Throughout the investigation of the pseudo-Fujianese, Yu was still referred to as "the one who calls himself Yu Yŏlli,"<sup>23</sup> and the *Veritable Records of Sukchong*, which was compiled and edited more than three decades after the events in

<sup>17</sup> *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 41:55a–55b [1687.5.27]. Zhang Yunshou appears elsewhere in the *Records of the Border Defence Command* as Zhang Wenxue 張文學. He and his companions are discussed in greater detail below in section 4.

<sup>18</sup> *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 41:57b [1687.6.1].

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> This was a title given to Kim Ŭngha (1580–1619), a hero and martyr of the Battle of Sarhu of 1619. See section 3 for further discussion.

<sup>21</sup> Cho Hyŏnmyŏng ed., *Sinbo sugyo chimnok* (Kyujanggak #kyu 1158) 2: fr. 96: "變易姓名, 作[詐]稱漂漢人, 狂惑村民, 欺罔國家者, 依詐稱遼東伯罪人, 因鞫廳啓辭, 不待時斬例, 論不待時處斬. 康熙丁卯承傳." The first 詐 is incorrectly written 作 in the surviving edition of the text, as is pointed out in Chōsen Sōtokufu Chūsūin, ed., *Chosŏn wangjo pŏpchŏn chip* [Collected Law Codes of the Chosŏn Dynasty] (Seoul: Kyŏng'in munhwasa, 1974): 2: 414.

<sup>22</sup> Kim Chaero ed., *Soktaejŏn* (Kyujanggak #kojo 33) 5:3b: "變易姓名, 詐稱漂漢人, 狂惑村民, 欺罔國家者, 不待時處斬."

<sup>23</sup> *Sukchong sillok* 18:23a [1687.5.2]. See beginning of section 1 for the complete quote.

question (between 1720 and 1728)<sup>24</sup> was no clearer about his actual identity, although it clearly identified him as a Korean from Honam. Whoever he was, he was clearly either a liar or a fantasist, or both, and extremely effective in spinning his lies, preventing even the Border Defence Command from reaching a conclusion for at least a month, and before that convincing local islanders and the governor of Chŏlla. The man styling himself Yu Yŏlli, in other words, was no mere liar or a fantasist, as he was able to speak a common vocabulary with villagers, local officials, and the Chosŏn court. His lies, as a result, are informative of elite and non-elite responses in late Chosŏn to China, Chinese people and the Ming dynasty.

Lies, secrets and rumours, as Luise White points out, are in many ways as informative as the truth. Secrets, for instance, are less a matter of concealing information as of deciding which people may be privy to which types of information, and also of setting off certain types of information as privileged and important. Lying, on the other hand, is “the deliberate attempt not only to conceal but to conceal well.”<sup>25</sup> Convincing lies provide an explanation which is plausible to listeners or readers, and may, in fact, be preferable to the messy reality with which they are actually faced. At the same time, lies frequently hint at what the authorities consider to be especially important. Lies show what a society can and cannot rationalize, and reveal the social networks in which certain types of information are considered plausible. In a similar context, rumours, however baseless, reveal that which a society finds convincing, the people that a society considers credible, and the social networks through which information travels.

Diplomacy, as the phrase “to speak diplomatically” suggests, employs its own special categories of dishonesty. Diplomatic documents often contain such a wide range of lies, secrets, and rumours as to make it at times nearly impossible for the diplomatic historian to access the truth. In diplomacy one frequently publicly accepts a position while hinting in various ways at the limits of this agreement.<sup>26</sup> The Qing-Chosŏn relationship after Chosŏn’s submission to the Qing empire in 1637 is one extreme example, partly because post-submission Chosŏn served the Qing empire publically even as it maintained a domestic show of loyalty to the Ming dynasty. For instance, shortly after Chosŏn’s defeat in 1637, Chosŏn was

<sup>24</sup> See the Kyujanggak bibliographic information (*baeje*) for the *Sukchong sillok* (kyu 12739-v.1-73), available via the e-Kyujanggak.

<sup>25</sup> Luise White, “Telling More: Lies, Secrets, and History,” *History and Theory* 39, no. 4 (2000): 11–22.

<sup>26</sup> White, “Telling More,” 14–15. A recent discussion of the role of rumour and ideology in Chosŏn’s military involvement against the Ming empire between 1637 and 1644 may be found in Saeyoung Park, “Memory, Counternarrative and the Body Politic in Post-Imjin Korea,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 19, no. 1 (2014): 153–178.

forced to participate in the Qing assault on the Ming outpost of Kado 椴島, an island within Chosŏn territory off the coast of northern P'yŏngan Province that had come under the control of Ming refugee soldiers after the fall of Liaodong to the Manchu following the Battle of Sarhu in 1619. The commander of the Chosŏn invasion force, Yu Rim 柳琳 (1581–1643), did well enough to be praised and rewarded by the Qing emperor Hong Taiji, although Yu Rim expressed his anti-Qing hostility by refusing this award.<sup>27</sup> The next in command to Yu Rim, Im Kyŏngŏp 林慶業 (1594–1646), secretly communicated with the Ming army to reduce Ming casualties, an action that became a source of trouble later when his treachery was revealed to the Qing court by one of the Ming officers involved.<sup>28</sup> Within the Chosŏn court itself, great effort was made to assert, without any direct evidence, that the Chosŏn army had not participated in the slaughter of the Ming Chinese inhabitants of the island.<sup>29</sup>

Indeed, during the seventeenth century, as long as remnant Ming states still existed, Chosŏn's loyalty was expressed in terms of what Hŏ T'aeyong refers to as Chunghwa Restoration Consciousness (*Chunghwa hoebok ūisik* 中華回復意識), which is to say, the belief that the core duty of Chosŏn officials was to overthrow the Qing and restore a proper representative of the idealized Chinese (Chunghwa 中華) tradition by re-establishing the Ming state.<sup>30</sup> Even during the Chosŏn period itself some, such as Pak Chiwŏn 朴趾源 (1737–1805), suggested that, at best, Chosŏn's military plans against the Qing had been entirely lacking in practical application.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, some now suspect that military plans to attack the Qing empire during the reign of Hyojong 孝宗 (r. 1649–1659) and Sukchong 肅宗 (r. 1674–1720) were in fact largely a technique for managing domestic dissent,

<sup>27</sup> Kye Sŏngbŏm, *Chosŏn sidae haee p'abyŏng kwa Han-Jung kwan'gye: Chosŏn chibaech'ŭng ūi Chungguk insik* [Dispatch of troops abroad during the Chosŏn period and Sino-Korean relations: The concept of China among Chosŏn's ruling elite] (Seoul: P'urŭn yŏksa, 2009), 225.

<sup>28</sup> For a recent discussion in English of Im Kyŏngŏp, see Saeyoung Park, "Memory, Counter-narrative and the Body Politic."

<sup>29</sup> Kye Sŏngbŏm, *Chosŏn sidae haee p'abyŏng*, 241–279.

<sup>30</sup> See Hŏ T'aeyong, *Chosŏn hugi Chunghwaron kwa yŏksa insik* [Late Chosŏn discussion of Chunghwa and historical consciousness] (Seoul: Ak'anet, 2009), 113–134. Chunghwa 中華 is pronounced Zhonghua in Chinese, and of course is generally translated "China." I use the Korean pronunciation here to emphasise that the Chunghwa in question is not primarily the political China or the current concept of a Chinese nation-state, but an idealized historic China discussed and debated by Chosŏn elites. On this subject, readers are also encouraged to consult Pae Usŏng, *Chosŏn kwa Chunghwa: Chosŏn i kekum kekugo sangsang han segye wa munmyŏng* [Chosŏn and Chunghwa: The world and civilization that Chosŏn dreamed and imagined] (P'aju: Tolbegae, 2014).

<sup>31</sup> Notably, Pak Chiwŏn expresses this view in his famous "Tale of Mr. Vacuous" (*Hŏsaeng-jŏn* 許生傳) in the *Jehol Diary* (*Yŏrba ilgi* 熱河日記). See Pak Chiwŏn, *Yŏrba ilgi*, vol. II, trans. Ri Sangho (P'aju: Pori, 2004), 254–270.



although it is also notable that these same openly seditious plans against the Qing persisted despite frequent outward shows of loyalty by the Chosŏn court to the Qing empire.<sup>32</sup> More peaceful resistance on the part of the Chosŏn court was expressed in the continued domestic use of the era name of the Chongzhen emperor (r. 1627–1644), the last Ming emperor to rule in north China.<sup>33</sup>

Notably, the largely unsuccessful military preparations of the late seventeenth century were bound up with issues surrounding Ming migrants and castaways. As surveyed by Pierre-Emmanuel Roux, the Chosŏn court had to deal with an immensely complicated web of diplomatic and domestic politics in its response to castaways. Two major groups of Chinese castaways arrived on Chosŏn's west coast during the seventeenth century: Chinese sailors with shaved heads who accepted Qing suzerainty and Chinese sailors with long hair who accepted the authority of the Southern Ming remnant states. One of Japan's key diplomatic demands on Chosŏn was that it hand over all castaways to Japan, so that the Edo *bakufu* could arrest and execute any Kirishitan (Christian) sailors among the crew. In the case of ships showing clear loyalty to the Qing empire, however, Chosŏn's usual practice was to send them back to Beijing, while ensuring that no information on the subject was passed to the Japanese. More difficult were cases involving sailors loyal to the southern Ming. The Chosŏn court, domestically, considered itself loyal to the Ming dynasty, even if this was largely an impractical stance. Returning Ming castaways to Qing China, and generally to their execution, powerfully and visibly revealed the Chosŏn court's Ming Loyalism to be without practical content. On the other hand, Chosŏn officials feared that failure to send such castaways to Qing China might result in Qing reprisals if the Qing court discovered that the Chosŏn court had been protecting Ming sailors. As a result, the usual Chosŏn approach, beginning in the 1650s, was to limit knowledge of the arrival of castaways as much as possible, and if the ships were at all seaworthy, send them on their way.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> For a survey of scholarship on the “northern expedition,” see Kye Sŭngbŏm, “Chosŏn sidae Asia chilsŏ wa Han-Jung kwan'gye,” [The Asian world order during the Chosŏn period and Sino-Korean relations] in *Han-Jung-Il hakkye ūi Han-Jung kwan'gyesa ūi yŏn'gu wa chaengjŏm*, ed. Tongbuga yŏksa chaedan (Seoul: Tongbuga yŏksa chaedan, 2009), 125–186. A recent and highly informative discussion is Hŏ T'aeyong, “17–18 segi pukpŏllon ūi ch'ui wa pukhangnon ūi taedu” [Trends in the discussion of the Northern Expedition during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the emergence of discussion concerning Northern Learning], *Taedong munhwa yŏn'gu* 69 (2010): 374–418.

<sup>33</sup> Jahyun Kim Haboush, “Contesting Chinese Time, Nationalizing Temporal Space: Temporal Inscription in Late Chosŏn Korea,” in *Time, Temporality and Imperial Transition*, ed. Lynn Struve (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), 115–141.

<sup>34</sup> Pierre-Emmanuel Roux, “The Prohibited Sect of Yaso: Catholicism in Diplomatic and Cultural

A representative case of such a controversy occurred in 1667, twenty years before the case of Yu Yölli. In that year, a crew of ninety-five Fujianese official merchants from Taiwan, including two men called Lin Yinguan 林寅觀 and Chen De 陳得, were shipwrecked on Cheju Island. This ship caused great excitement, as they brought a calendar dating the year to Yongli 21, in this way following the established practice in Taiwan under the Zheng 鄭 family to pretend that the Yongli 永曆 (r. 1646–1662) emperor still lived and reigned.<sup>35</sup> Lin Yinguan, Chen De and crew were thus seen by some as revealing the continued existence of the Ming emperor in the South,<sup>36</sup> and indeed Lin Yinguan, in common with many people in Taiwan, seems to have believed the official fiction of the Zheng family regime that the Yongli emperor continued to rule in mainland Southeast Asia.<sup>37</sup> While certainly many were suspicious of the stability of the Southern Ming despite the arrival of Lin Yinguan, others were more hopeful. The great intellectual leader of the Söin 西人, Song Siyöl 宋時烈 (1607–1689) himself, wrote in a letter to Yi In 李堦 (1608–1668) of his excitement upon hearing via Lin Yinguan of the continued existence of the Ming remnant state.<sup>38</sup>

Although the Yongli emperor had been captured and executed by Qing forces in 1662, Chosön's knowledge of the Yongli emperor had been so dependent on rumour that reports of the continued survival of the Yongli emperor could not be dismissed out of hand. Previously, during Hyojong's reign, the Yongli emperor's existence in the south had been the subject of conspiratorial rumour obtained under the nose of the Qing court.<sup>39</sup> Nor were Qing reports of the Yongli

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Encounters between Edo Japan and Chosön Korea (17<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> Century),” in *Space and Location in Circulation of Knowledge (1400–1800): Korea and Beyond*, ed. Marion Eggert, Felix Siegmund and Dennis Würthner (Berne: Peter Lange, 2014), 124–128.

<sup>35</sup> Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 155.

<sup>36</sup> *Hyönjong sillok* 14:2a [1667.6.21]. Matters related to the Ming calendar are surveyed by U Kyöngsöp, *Chosön Chünghwajuüi üi söngnip kwa Tong Asia* [East Asia and the establishment of Chosön Chünghwa ideology] (Seoul: Yunisüt'ori, 2013): 146–53.

<sup>37</sup> Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia*, 179–180.

<sup>38</sup> Söng Haeüng, *Yön'gyöngjae chönjip* [Collected works of Yön'gyöngjae] 277:42b, *Knaeinsabon* edition (n.d.), preserved in Korea National University Rare Books Library, # kwi 555, 555A, 555B: “福建泉漳人，皆唐服色，不削髮，其中陳得，林寅觀，鄭喜，曾勝四人能文，謂永曆皇帝保有南方四省，宗社不替，衣冠依舊，今爲永曆二十一年，其所持曆書亦然云。積歲未知存亡之餘，忽得此信，喜極而悲，感涕無窮。” This letter is preserved in Söng Haeüng (1760–1839)'s collected works, but not in the Kyujanggak edition of the *Songja taejön* [Grand compendium of the works of Master Song]. I became aware of both letters via Kim Munsik, “Söng Haeüng chüngho han *Chöngmi chönsin rok*” [The *Chöngmi chönsin rok* as supplemented by Söng Haeüng], *Chindan hakpo* 115 (2012): 93–122. Kim Munsik does not explain the absence of this passage from the Kyujanggak edition of *Songja taejön*. Sadly, the textual history of this passage is beyond the scope of the current article.

<sup>39</sup> For instance, *Hyöjong sillok* 5: 3b [1650.8.27].

emperor's death in 1662 necessarily believed. According to the "Yearly Chronicle" (*yŏnbo* 年報) of Song Siyŏl's life compiled by his grandson Song Chusŏk 宋疇錫 (1650–1692) and included in the supplement to Song Siyŏl's collected works,<sup>40</sup> Song, upon hearing of the death of the Yongli emperor, lamented that the realm (*ch'ŏnha* 天下) could never be restored.<sup>41</sup> However, many in Chosŏn continued to suspect that the Yongli emperor might not in fact have been executed. Thus, in 1663, the envoys returning from Beijing who reported on the Yongli emperor's death to the Chosŏn court concluded their report with a reference to a semi-literate Han Chinese man encountered on the road who informed them that the "Yongli emperor has not died, but still holds out in the southern regions. The arrogant statements by the Qing court should not be believed."<sup>42</sup> In fact, the Chosŏn court continued to depend on rumour and castaways right through the revolt of the three feudatories, during which information obtained through informal contacts by Chosŏn envoys to the Qing capital, via Chinese castaways in Chosŏn and Korean castaways in China became a vital source of information about China not only for the Chosŏn court but also for the Edo *bakufu* in Japan. At the same time, Japanese commercial contacts with Chinese merchants provided vital information not only to Edo but also to the Chosŏn court.<sup>43</sup> Thus, the arrival of Lin Yŏnguan's crew provided evidence that was as credible as much of the information that the Chosŏn court had previously received, and would continue to receive, concerning the southern Ming, and Lin was as close to a formal representative of the southern Ming court as Chosŏn had, or was likely to, receive.

<sup>40</sup> This information concerning the compilation of the *Songja taejŏn* may be found in the bibliographic information (*haeje*) of the Database of Korean Classics.

<sup>41</sup> "Yŏnbo," *Songja taejŏn* purok 4:36b: "先生有小記曰：今年五月二十三日，因忠清監司，聞永曆皇帝，破亡被青衣之辱。天下事自此無復可望矣。不勝痛哭失聲也。" The text used is the 1787 edition currently preserved in the Kyujanggak, Kyujanggak # Kyu 3452. See U Kyŏngsŏp, *Chosŏn Chunghwajūi ūi sŏngnip*, 136–137 for reactions to the Yongli emperor's death.

<sup>42</sup> *Hyŏnjong kaesu sillok* 8:24a and *Hyŏnjong sillok* 6:29a, both dated 1663.3.1.

<sup>43</sup> For the spread of information concerning the Southern Ming to Chosŏn, see U Kyŏngsŏp, *Chosŏn Chunghwajūi ūi sŏngnip*, 133–138; Chin P'a [Chen Bo], "Sambŏn ūi nan ūl tullŏsan Ilbon kwa Chosŏn ūi chŏngbo kyosŏp" [The exchange of information between Chosŏn and Japan concerning the Revolt of the Three Feudatories], in *Haeyang kwa tong Asia ūi munhwa kyoryu*, ed. Yi Haeyŏng and Ri Sangu (Seoul: Tosŏ ch'ulp'an kyŏngjŏn, 2014), 174–209; Matsuura Akira, *Kaigai jōhō kara miru Higashi Ajia: tōsen fūsetsugakē no sekai* [East Asia seen through information from abroad: The world of records of rumours from Chinese ships] (Ōsaka: Seibundō, 2009); Kim Ch'angsu, "17 segi hugan Chosŏn t'ongsinsa ūi kongsik pogo wa chŏngch'ijŏk p'ajang" [Official reports during the seventeenth century by Chosŏn envoys to Japan and their political effect], *Sabak yŏn'gu* 106 (2012): 141–173.

In this context, the repatriation of Lin Yinguan's crew to Qing China could not but become the source of considerable domestic controversy in Chosŏn. Lin and his crew did not want to be sent to the Qing Empire, but wanted to continue their journey to Japan. Nevertheless, angry controversy erupted both within and without the Chosŏn court, with strong protests being levied against the court's decision to repatriate Lin and his crew. The alternatives were sending them to Japan, or concealing them in Chosŏn. As the discussion in the *Revised Veritable Records of Hyŏnjong* (*Hyŏnjong kaesu sillok* 顯宗改修實錄) reveals, the Chosŏn officials in charge suspected Lin Yinguan of being a Catholic, which meant that his return to Japan would likely result in his execution, even as it would also risk angering the Qing court.<sup>44</sup> In any case, it was clear to the Chosŏn officials involved that Lin Yinguan had no direct connection to the Yongli emperor, but was associated with the Zheng family in Taiwan, concerning whom the Chosŏn court was extremely wary.<sup>45</sup> Huang Gong 黃功, a Ming migrant resident in Chosŏn was dispatched to convince Lin Yinguan and his crew that the Qing was by then secure and that they would be well treated,<sup>46</sup> and indeed, ultimately, Lin and his crew were sent back to the Qing Empire despite vigorous protest by *yangban* elites and officials within Chosŏn.<sup>47</sup> While the official line at the time was in accord with Huang's belief in their ultimate good treatment by the Qing, by the eighteenth century it was believed that they had all been executed in Ninggŭtta.<sup>48</sup>

Following the Lin Yinguan incident, Chosŏn local magistrates became much more careful in their approach to Chinese castaways, sending castaways away as

<sup>44</sup> *Hyŏnjong kaesu sillok* 17:42a [1667.6.23]: “似聞渠輩，欲往日本云，托以耶蘇之黨，入送日本，未知如何。”上曰：“耶蘇之事，彼若有聞，則亦必不喜矣。” Lin Yinguan's suspected Catholicism is emphasized by Roux, “The Prohibited Sect of Yaso,” 126.

<sup>45</sup> During the interrogation of Lin Yinguan, the officials in charge were concerned to show that Lin had never been to the Ming capital, and was in fact simply a subject of the Zheng Qin. When they successfully established this fact, Lin, who must have recognized that his fate had been sealed, simply wept. *Hyŏnjong kaesu sillok* 18:17b [1667.10.3]: “又問 汝等無乃鄭經之管下乎？寅觀等不答，但流涕而已。”

<sup>46</sup> “Hwang-Chin mundap” in *Yŏn'gyŏngjae chŏnjip oejip* 34:28a–38b; Kim Munsik, “Sŏng Haeŭng,” 115.

<sup>47</sup> In addition to works by Roux, Hang and U, cited above, this event is also discussed by Sun Weiguo, “Yili yu xianshi de chongtu: Cong dingwei piaoliuren shijian kan Chaoxian wangchao zhi zun Ming bian Qing wenhua xintai” [The conflict between orthodox thought and reality: Chosŏn's pro-Ming/Anti-Qing sentiment as seen in the attitudes to the ninety-five drifting persons from Taiwan in 1667], *Hanxue yanjiu* 25, no. 2 (2007): 187–210 and Kang Ch'angnyong, “17 segi chungyŏp Chunggugin ūi Cheju p'yoch'ak: Hyŏnjŏng p'allyŏn (1667) Myŏng nara sangin Im In'gwan irhaeng ūi Cheju p'yoch'ak ch'ŏri rŭl chungsim ūro” [The arrival of Chinese in Cheju during the Mid-seventeenth century: With a focus on the handling of the Ming merchant Lin Yinguan and crew during the eighth year of Hyŏnjong (1667)], *T'amma munbwa* 25 (2004): 25–59.

<sup>48</sup> See Kim Munsik, 104–105, for this debate.

soon as possible, even to the extent of providing a new boat, and otherwise avoiding informing the central court unless absolutely necessary.<sup>49</sup> Through this, the Chosŏn court hoped to both staunch the flow of information to the Qing court and avoid future divisive political controversies of the sort caused by the repatriation of Lin Yinguan's crew. Indeed, three years after Lin Yinguan, the Cheju magistrate followed this policy with a Nagasaki-bound ship filled with Ming migrants based in a Southeast Asian polity, whose hairstyles (Ming, Qing and Japanese) suggested considerable diversity of political associations.<sup>50</sup> The Chosŏn court, in other words, preferred to limit all knowledge of matters related to Ming Chinese castaways rather than risk bringing to the surface contradictions between the reality of Chosŏn's international relationships and its domestic pose of loyalty to the Ming dynasty.

To be sure, the incident with Yu Yŏlli occurred after the fall of the Zheng regime in Taiwan and Qing reopening of trade, as the Chosŏn court would have known not only through its diplomatic contacts but also through Zhang Wenda's crew in the same year, who spoke with enthusiasm concerning the reopening of maritime trade by the Qing.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, by 1687 rumours and stories brought by castaways had become part of the political and ideological struggle in Chosŏn. Indeed, even as late as 1712, Chosŏn envoys treated rumours of a successful Ming Loyalist revolt in Fujian as factual,<sup>52</sup> and in 1711 an anonymous pamphleteer in Seoul could cause serious concern by claiming in his pamphlet to be the representative of a maritime Ming Loyalist state.<sup>53</sup> Thus Yu Yŏlli, by assuming the role of a Ming Loyalist castaway, had placed himself in a politically and ideologically contentious position.

### 3. YU YŎLLI, LIN YINGUAN AND MING LOYALIST PERFORMANCE

Yu's lies succeeded at least in part because his lies accorded closely to the particular set of falsehoods in which the Chosŏn court was participating. Yu, in other words, mimicked for his private purposes the narrative of Chunghwa Restoration in which much of the Chosŏn court and *yangban* elites outside of the

<sup>49</sup> Kang Ch'angnyong, "17 segi chungyŏp chungyŏp Chunggugin ūi Cheju p'yoch'ak", 51–52.

<sup>50</sup> *Hyŏnjong sillok* 18: 29a [1670.7.11].

<sup>51</sup> *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 41:47a–47b [1687.5.15]: "癸亥以前, 則鄭克塽·吳三桂·尚可喜等, 不歸順, 故海防極嚴矣, 今則天下太平, 海路洞然矣."

<sup>52</sup> *Sukchong sillok* 51: 45a [1712.7.26].

<sup>53</sup> See Adam Bohnet, "Subversive Ming Loyalist Narratives in Late Chosŏn Korea," *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 25, no. 1 (2012): 1–31.

court were invested. We cannot know now how Yu learned the attitudes and ideological predilections of the Chosŏn court. Some of his lies may have developed through his initial interrogation by the office of the area commander of Chido or by the governor of Chŏlla province, for which we currently have no record. Nevertheless, one can appreciate the success of his lies by comparing his communication with Chosŏn officials to the discussion surrounding the earlier case of Lin Yinguan. Lin Yinguan and his crew had attracted the attention of the Chosŏn *yangban* elites by bringing rumour of the survival of a Ming Loyalist state, even as in other respects, such as their desire to engage in trade with Japan, their association with a piratical regime, and their Christianity, they were poor representatives of the Chunghwa Restoration Consciousness. Yu, however, speaking in an artificial language of his own making, was able to mimic the attitudes of the Chosŏn court more effectively than Lin Yinguan and crew, who, as they were actually castaways from a regime that genuinely claimed some connection to Ming Loyalism, had been tethered to some resemblance of reality.

In 1667, a frequent worry on the part of the numerous petitioners who had demanded the protection of Lin Yinguan and crew was the certainty of their death upon entrance into Qing control. When the fourth counsellor (*ŭnggyo* 應教) Nam Isŏng 南二星 (1625–1683) and the section chief (*chŏngnang* 正郎) of the Board of Personal Yi Tanha 李端夏 demanded the protection of Lin Yinguan's crew, they described their reasons as follows:

I have heard that when the Han castaways arrived at the Hongjewŏn 洪濟院<sup>54</sup> guesthouse, their weeping and crying was most tragic. A hundred guiltless people are being sent to their death. Although we are not killing them, their death is occurring through our actions. How utterly devastating!<sup>55</sup>

Yu, similarly, phrased his fear of being sent to Qing China on the basis of what he claimed was the near certainty of execution at Qing hands:

When he heard that he might stay in our country, he became extremely happy. When suggestions were made concerning repatriation to Beijing, he pointed to his head, seemingly suggesting that he feared decapitation.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>54</sup> The Hongjewŏn guesthouse, in present-day Hongje-dong in the district of Sŏdaemun-gu in Seoul, was the usual guesthouse for Chinese envoys visiting Seoul.

<sup>55</sup> *Hyŏnjong kaesu sillok* 18:18a [1667.10.3]; *Hyŏnjong sillok* 14:11a [1667.7.2]: “聞漂人等，到弘濟院號哭，祈哀萬狀云。百人性命，無罪就死。我雖不殺，其死由我，則是非慘痛之甚乎？”

<sup>56</sup> *Pibyŏnsa tŕngnok* 41:40b [1687.5.3]: “問以留置本國，則甚爲喜幸，以入送北京爲言，則以手指頸，顯有畏被斬頭之狀。”

Of course, Lin and his crew had only secondarily expressed a desire to remain in Chosŏn, and had primarily wanted to be sent to the major trading entrepot of Nagasaki. However, Yu, by miming fear and expressing the specific desire to remain in Chosŏn, was far closer to the late Chosŏn image of the Ming Loyalist castaway.

Yu also seems to have recognized other aspects of the political obsessions of Chosŏn's elites. According to a record of conversations (*ŏrok* 語錄) by Ch'oe Sin 崔愼 (1642–1708), a student of Song Siyŏl, when Song had heard of the arrival of Lin Yinguan and his crew in Cheju, he had been largely unimpressed by the claim that their arrival represented the establishment of a contact between Ming and Chosŏn, and for this reason saw no reason to abandon the era name of the Chongzhen era name for the Yongli era name. Although he had previously responded to the death of the Yongli emperor,<sup>57</sup> he did not argue that their claim of the survival of the Yongli emperor was false, but merely insisted that trustworthy contact could only be established through the arrival of official envoys.<sup>58</sup> However, when they were forcibly returned to Qing China, Song responded with disappointment that he had failed to discuss Zhu Xi 朱熹 with them:

When our master heard that they had come from Fujian, he lamented, saying: “If I had met the Han people, I would have asked them about surviving traces of Master Zhu.”<sup>59</sup>

Begging for sympathy by emphasising their connection to Zhu Xi and Fujian, of course, had not occurred to Lin Yinguan's crew in 1667, at least according to the surviving transcripts. Whether or not it would have been successful in 1667, outside of Song Siyŏl's fantasies, may, of course, be doubted. Yu did, however, employ reference to Master Zhu in an attempt to garner sympathy from the Chosŏn court:

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<sup>57</sup> See section 2.

<sup>58</sup> U Kyŏngsŏp, *Chosŏn Chunghwajuŭi ūi sŏngnip*, 147–148, in his discussion of this incident, argues that Song Siyŏl's rejection of the Yongli era name was influenced by the fact that he knew that the Yongli emperor had died in 1662. However, in the text itself Song does not say this explicitly, but merely argues that the social status of the bearers of the calendar—merchants and not formal envoys—means that the contact could not be treated as credible. Indeed, there is no reason to think that Song was any more certain of the veracity of the reports of the Yongli emperor's death than were others in Chosŏn.

<sup>59</sup> “Ch'oe Sin rok” in “Ŏrok,” *Songja taejŏn* purok 17:11a: “宋子愼曰.用永曆何如.先生曰.彼言何可信.就使可信.曾無頒布於我國者.莫如因用崇禎也.朝家以耽羅所得中原人.押到漢師.仍執送虜中.京鄉士子往見.先生聞其來自泉漳.歎曰.得逢漢人.則欲問朱子故蹟.而不可見也.”

Also he said that Koryŏ had received great grace from Zhu Fuzi 朱夫子, and for this reason begged to be spared death.<sup>60</sup>

In other words, Yu Yŏn of Honam, by assuming a Chinese identity, was able to fit himself into a narrative that he hoped would convince Chosŏn officials, including an appeal to the link between Chosŏn and Zhu Xi's philosophy that had occurred to Song Siyŏl but that had not actually been mentioned by the castaways in Lin Yinguan's crew.

To be sure, Yu's success as a liar should not be exaggerated. Not only had the Qing abandoned its policy of coastal evacuation, but Yu Yŏlli, in claiming a Ming Loyalist identity, placed himself in what was by then a well-known, and at times dangerous, category of fraudulent Ming Loyalist. Huang Gong, the migrant who gained some prominence as an interpreter for Lin Yinguan's crew when it came ashore in 1667, and who at that point encouraged Lin Yinguan's crew to return to the Qing,<sup>61</sup> later memorialized in 1675 to the court requesting that the Chosŏn court aid the Zheng family in maritime China and send him as an envoy. This request was rejected out of hand because it was widely suspected that the "Chinese (Tangin 唐人) Huang Gong" was merely acting for Yun Hyu 尹鑄 (1617–1680), a strong advocate of active military preparation against the Qing,<sup>62</sup> who thought that "a subject of the superior country" (*taegugin* 大國人) would prove a more effective intermediary.<sup>63</sup> The discussion among the state counselors that followed the memorial established Huang's lies in even greater detail. The prominent leader of the Namin 南人 faction, Hŏ Chŏk 許積 (1610–1680), asserted that Huang, despite having been emancipated by Hyojong, provided poor reward for royal grace by fraudulently claiming knowledge of gunpowder production and martial skill in order to pursue his own private ends. At one point,

<sup>60</sup> *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 41:40b [1687.5.3]: "且言高麗，大受朱夫子之恩，仍乞免死。"

<sup>61</sup> See section 1 above.

<sup>62</sup> Concerning Yun Hyu in English, see Jahyun Kim Haboush, "Yun Hyu and the Search for Dominance: A Seventeenth-Century Korean Reading of the Offices of Zhou and the Rituals of Zhou," in *Statecraft and Classical Learning: The Rituals of Zhou in East Asian History*, eds. Benjamin A. Elman and Martin Kern (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 309–329; Martina Deuchler, "Despoilers of the Way: Insulters of the Sages: Controversies over Classics in Seventeenth-Century Korea," in *Culture and the State in Late Chosŏn Korea*, ed. Jahyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 91–133; Miura Kunio, "Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in Seventeenth-Century Korea: Song Siyol and Yun Hyu," in *The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea*, eds. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Jahyun Kim Haboush (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 411–444.

<sup>63</sup> *Sukchong sillok* 3:23b [1675.4.1]: "唐人 黃功上疏，請渡海奉使於鄭錦。且獻孝廟御筆，又言曉十八般武藝，願得教習武士。功爲人浮誕。尹鑄方爲通錦之論，以功大國人，必爲上所信用，勸令陳疏，而功實無行意。"



according to Hō, Huang had claimed that northern Hamgyōng was the best place for gunpowder production because he was hoping to meet a woman in that province.<sup>64</sup>

In fact, the precedent for Yu Yōlli's punishment given in the *Newly Supplemented Collection of Royal Edicts* was the “punishment for the one who had falsely claimed to be the Yodong-baek,”<sup>65</sup> which referred to another recent case of fraudulent Ming Loyalism. In 1680, during the Sōin restoration and the purge of those associated with the Namin faction that had previously controlled the state, Yun Hyu was purged along with his supporters. One of those supporters was Pak Sangwōn 朴尙元, described by Kim Suhang 金壽恒 (1629–168) as an “ignorant soldier” who flattered Yun Hyu and who shared Yun Hyu's enthusiasm for an attack on the Qing. Although Pak avoided providing any incriminating evidence against his fellows, a letter was discovered in his possession that addressed him as Yodong-baek. The accusation against him then was claiming a title originally granted to Kim Ūnghwa, a great Ming Loyalist hero who died in the Battle of Sarhu of 1619, even though in Pak's case the key failure on his part was refusing to reject the title when he was so addressed by others. Although no other charge could stick, this charge provided the pretext to send him to the execution grounds. Pak Sangwōn did not deny that his acquaintances referred to him by this title, but he said that because of his simple but honest character, and his pride in loyalty and righteousness, he was compared by his friends to the Yodong-baek.<sup>66</sup> Pak Sangwōn, in other words, almost certainly considered himself a Chunghwa Restorationist, just like his hero Yun Hyu, and understood his own use of the title

<sup>64</sup> *Sukchong sillok* 3:24a [1675.4.3]: “積曰：‘臣請先言功之爲人。孝廟贖出率來，舍之本宮之側，給料厚待，渠必爲惑，而但虛談，無實功。曾言知燔硝，下送忠清道監燔，則歸言，地不好不成。後言入咸鏡道則可燔，臣陳達乘駟遣之，令戶曹製給毛衣，又爲不燔而來。其實渠成婚於金城地，欲乘驛以去。爲此欺罔之言，臣等再見誑矣。渠言知四條槍法云，問于柳赫然則可知。’赫然曰：‘臣嘗欲招試，則每稱病不來，故武士無學得者。’”

<sup>65</sup> Literally, the Earl of Liaodong (C. *Liaodong-bo*). This was a title granted by the Ming Wanli Emperor to Kim Ūnghwa (1580–1619) for his courageous death during the joint Chinese-Korean expedition during the Battle of Sarhu. Under this title he was also honoured in Chosōn as a representative loyal subject. See Yu Mina, “Simha chōnt'u ū myōngiang Kim Ūnghwa wa *Ch'ungnyōllok* p'anhwa” [The famous general of the Battle of Sarhu Kim Ūnghwa and the woodblock prints of the *Ch'ungnyōllok*], *Yōllin chōngsin immunbak yōn'gu* 12, no. 1(2011): 97–147; Im Wanhyōk, “Myōng.Ch'ōng kyoch'egi Chosōn ū taeūng kwa *Ch'ungnyōllok* ū ūimi” [Chosōn's response to the Ming-Qing transition and the meaning of the *Ch'ungnyōllok*], *Hanmun hakpo* 12 (2005): 179–217.

<sup>66</sup> *Sukchong sillok* 9:44b [1680.5.19]: “朴尙元本來凶惡，鏞常以北伐爲言，如尙元之無識武夫爲媚悅之地，其所上書，符合於鏞，故鏞乃大悅，傾心相結。且與口、台瑞相切，凶謀無不與知。至如遼東伯之說，渠自以爲，平生以忠義自許，人皆以此目之云，情迹極可愕矣。諸臣或欲與口，一體參酌。” 壽恒曰：“凶謀之跡雖不吐實，以假稱遼東伯之事，處斷宜矣。” 鼎重曰：“遼東伯即故金應河所贈爵也。自比於金應河者，尤極凶惡。”

among his friends not as an example of falsely claiming a title, but of emulation. The Sŏin who took control of the state, however, denied both the truth of Yun Hyu's calls for a northern expedition against the Qing, and the reality of any Ming Loyalist sentiment on Pak Sangwŏn's part.

Ultimately, Yu's lies were different in degree, if not in kind, from the fictions present within the Chosŏn court's own Ming Loyalist ideology. Initially, at least, Yu's lies were most effective, because they mimicked the well-accepted fictions current among the Chosŏn court and *yangban* elites. Ultimately, however, his lies, by also resembling a well-established category of political manipulation of Ming Loyalism, increased the severity of the punishment that he suffered.

#### 4. ISLANDERS, CASTAWAYS AND THE CHOSŎN COURT

Notably, the Border Defence Command was not the first victim of Yu's deception. For quite some time, the people in Chido had also fallen into his trap, as had the governor of Chŏlla province. Thus, Yu was able to fit his lies to a range of people, including islanders in a marginal region of Chosŏn. Because Yu's lies are only now available in the form that they took during his interrogation by the Border Defence Command, it is impossible to know the deceptions he employed in Chido. He was adept at changing his story to fit the circumstances, as is clear from the fact that he changed his supposed homeland from Dengzhou (when he was being interrogated in Chŏnju by the provincial governor) to Fujian (when he was being interrogated in the capital). Nevertheless, the sources do suggest significant differences in attitudes between islanders of Chŏlla and Chosŏn officialdom to castaways from China.

Foreign affairs, as Seonmin Kim,<sup>67</sup> James B. Lewis<sup>68</sup> and Hoon Lee<sup>69</sup> have pointed out for the late Chosŏn, may profitably be understood by focusing on the experience of the frontier as opposed to that of the capital. Interestingly, the pseudo-Fujianese incident reveals that one could survive by begging from peasants while pretending to be a Chinese castaway. Lewis has argued that the line between Koreans and Japanese in Tongnae had to be imposed through vigorous court activity. Similarly, in the islands off Chosŏn's west coast, Chinese castaways could be concealed and supported by sympathetic islanders, and the Chosŏn court

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<sup>67</sup> Seonmin Kim [Kim Sŏnmin], "Ginseng and Border Trespassing Between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea," *Late Imperial China* 28, no. 1 (2007): 33–61.

<sup>68</sup> James B. Lewis, *Frontier Contact Between Chosŏn Korea and Tokugawa Japan* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

<sup>69</sup> Hoon Lee [Yi Hun], "The Repatriation of Castaways in Chosŏn Korea-Japan Relations, 1599–1888," *Korean Studies* 30, no. 1 (October 2006): 67–90.

was challenged to prevent the growth of such unsanctioned solidarity.

The islands off Chosŏn's southwest coast were not, in contrast to Tsushima,<sup>70</sup> the eastern islands of Ullŭngdo and Tokto<sup>71</sup> or the region south of the upper Yalu and Tumen rivers,<sup>72</sup> characterized by a history of disputed claims or uncertain jurisdiction. Nor were the southwestern islands an area of legitimate interaction with foreigners. Nevertheless, they were, in the Chosŏn dynasty's conceptualization of borders, an example of edge territory (*pyŏnji*), which is to say, a region distant from the edifying influence of the Chosŏn monarch.<sup>73</sup> In this sense, the inhabitants of these islands, like the Jurchen and Japanese during the early Chosŏn,<sup>74</sup> were people through whom the Chosŏn monarch could prove his virtue by attracting them toward the civilizing power of his rule. The islands off the coast of Chŏlla had been important areas of settlement and trade during the Koryŏ period (918–1392), but during early Chosŏn official policy was generally to keep these islands empty of population so as to discourage Japanese raiders. Otherwise, during early Chosŏn, the court sought to establish court-controlled tree nurseries and horse ranches on the islands, a policy which made the largely impossible task of keeping these islands empty of population even more difficult.<sup>75</sup>

It however proved nearly impossible to keep the common people from settling in these many islands, and by the seventeenth century the Chosŏn court was forced to seek alternative means for policing the islands of its southwestern coast. Already during the sixteenth century the Chosŏn court began to approve or at least turn a blind eye to these new settlements, which were initially placed for the most part under the administration of coastal counties. The population of the islands further increased on account of refugees from Japanese armies during the Imjin War, and then expanded rapidly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Those settling the islands included Imjin refugees and impoverished

<sup>70</sup> For the early Chosŏn see Kenneth R. Robinson, "An Island's Place in History: Tsushima in Japan and Chosŏn, 1392–1592," *Korean Studies* 30 (2006): 38–64.

<sup>71</sup> Kim Hodong, *Tokto-Ullŭngdo ūi yŏksa* [The history of Tokto and Ullŭngdo] (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2007); Yun Yusuk, *Kŭnse Cho-Il kwan'gye wa Ullŭngdo* [Ullŭngdo and early modern relations between Chosŏn and Japan] (Seoul: Hyeon, 2016).

<sup>72</sup> Kang Sŏkhwa, *Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏngdo wa pukpang yŏngt'o ūisik* [Hamgyŏng Province during the late Chosŏn and consciousness of northern territory] (Seoul: Kyŏngsewŏn, 2000).

<sup>73</sup> Pae Usŏng, "Chosŏn hugi pyŏnjigwan pyŏnhwa wa chiyŏngmin insik" [Changes in attitudes toward edge territory during the late Chosŏn and the consciousness of local people], *Yŏksa hakpo* 160 (1998): 9–45.

<sup>74</sup> Kenneth R. Robinson, "Centering the King of Chosŏn: Aspects of Korean Maritime Diplomacy, 1392–1592," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 1 (2000): 109–125.

<sup>75</sup> Kim Kyŏngok, *Chosŏn hugi tosŏ yŏn'gu* [Research on islands during the late Chosŏn period] (Seoul: Hyeon, 2004), 47–67.

people looking for fertile land to settle, but also an inordinate number of tax-dodgers and runaway slaves.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, although these islands were not official locations for exchange, they faced the chaotic uncontrolled sea, and received as castaways the diverse inhabitants of the East China Sea, including Japanese, Chinese and Europeans, and also suffered from Chinese ships that deliberately entered into Chosŏn waters. Chinese and Japanese sailors brought with them significant security concerns—Japanese, obviously, because of the memories of the Imjin War, and Chinese sailors before 1683 because of their connection with the Zheng regime in Taiwan. Chinese sailors after 1683 also were a source of concern, because with the reopening of maritime trade by the Qing court, the number of Chinese sailors in the Yellow Sea increased considerably, and many were disinclined to respect the legal strictures of the Chosŏn court.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, the oceans brought not only people but destabilizing ideas, such as in 1681, when there were reports of a large number of foreign goods—including foreign Buddhist scriptures and other heretical texts—in the possession of the people of this region.<sup>78</sup>

Beginning with the late seventeenth century, the Chosŏn court sought to establish greater control over all its frontiers. Notably, on Korea's northern border, the Chosŏn court increasingly encouraged settlement in the region.<sup>79</sup> During the same period, it made greater use of the death penalty to punish illegal border crossing and illegal interaction with foreigners on both the northern border and in the vicinity of the Japan House in Tongnae.<sup>80</sup> In the case of the Chŏlla islands, the Chosŏn court responded to the disordered ocean and an uncontrolled population by establishing naval garrisons on the islands to control the growing settlements, handle security concerns, collect taxes and protect sea lanes. While some such garrisons had already been established during early Chosŏn, it was during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially beginning with the reign of Sukchong, that the Chosŏn state actively moved naval administrations from the mainland to the islands, and thus pursued a more active administration

<sup>76</sup> Kim Kyŏngok, *Chosŏn hugi tosŏ*, 67–84.

<sup>77</sup> Min Tŏkki, “Tong Asia haegŭm chŏngch’aek ūi pyŏnhwa wa haeyang kyŏnggye esŏ ūi punjaeng” [Changing policies on restricting overseas trade in East Asia and conflicts in coastal frontiers], *Han-Il kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu* 42 (2012): 189–228.

<sup>78</sup> *Sukchong sillok* 12:2a [1681.7.9].

<sup>79</sup> Kang Sŏkhwa, *Chosŏn hugi Hamgyŏngdo*, 130–178.

<sup>80</sup> Andŏsŭ K’alsŭn [Anders Karlsson], “Ch’ŏn’gŭm ūi cha nŭn chŏja esŏ ch’ŏhyŏng toejj annŭnda—17.18 segi Chosŏn sidae ūi sahyŏng kwa hyosu” [Scions of wealthy families do not die in the marketplace: Death penalty and *hyosu* punishment in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Chosŏn Korea], in *Tong Asia ūi sahyŏng*, ed. Tomiya Itaru, trans. Son Sŭnghŭi (Kyŏngsan: Yŏngnam taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 2014), 152–193.

of the islands.<sup>81</sup> The Chido garrison itself, where Yu was discovered, was established in 1682 to control numerous small islands scattered about the Naju archipelago. It continued to be part of Naju, and its revenue continued to be directed toward the Royal Stables Administration (Saboksi 司僕寺), reflecting its historical role as a horse pasture that it shared with many islands. As a naval commandery, it was placed under an area commander (*manbo*), who was responsible for maintaining a determined number of ships and soldiers.<sup>82</sup> As outlined in the 1867 “Map of Chido Commandery in Naju” (*Naju Chidojin chido* 羅州智島鎮地圖), the administrative centre of the garrison was on Chido proper, a large island divided by a narrow channel from the Muan Peninsula. As with other island commanderies, smaller islands were also placed under the purview of the commandery. The map shows the commandery to be in control of the islands of Saokdo 沙玉島, Yuldo 栗島, Pyöngp’ungdo 屏風島 and Songdo to the south, and Ch’amdo 站島 to the north. Most of the official buildings, however, were based on the main island, although of the two look-out points, one was located on the northern edge of the main island, while the other was positioned on Pyöngp’ungdo to the south.<sup>83</sup> At the establishment of the commandery in 1682, and indeed at the time of the case of Yu Yölli, many of the surrounding islands had not yet been fully organized as commanderies. The island of Imjado 荏子島, for instance, immediately to the west of Chido, became the centre of a new commandery only in 1711. Much further out to sea, Hüksando 黑山島 was organized into a commandery only in 1759.<sup>84</sup>

Of course, the islands were no strangers to castaways. A mere two years after the establishment of the Chido garrison and a mere three years before the case of the pseudo-Fujianese, the Chosön court interrogated Zhang Wenxue 張文學, Gu Yilun 顧一論 and Li Shouzhang 李守長, three Shandong boatmen from villages within the Penglai 蓬萊 district of Dengzhou prefecture who had also been discovered in the territory of the recently established Chido garrison. According to these three boatmen, they, along with a number of fellow boatmen, had travelled to an island a day north of the Shandong coast in order to bring charcoal back for sale, and were travelling back to the mainland when they were blown by a storm to Chosön. Only those three had survived to make it to land. When asked

<sup>81</sup> Kim Kyöngok, *Chosön hugi tosö*, 179–206.

<sup>82</sup> Concerning the administrative history of Chido garrison, see Song Yangsöp, “Chosön hugi Naju chedo üi chölsu wa sörup nonüi chön’gae” [The development of discussion during the late Chosön concerning the regularizing of administration in the Naju Archipelago], *Taedong munhwa yön’gu* 50 (2005): 377–420.

<sup>83</sup> *Naju Chidojin chido* (Kyujanggak # kyu 1049).

<sup>84</sup> Kim Kyöngok, *Chosön hugi tosö*, 191–192.

why they had survived for three months before being discovered by the Chosŏn court, they informed the court that they had received sustenance on a small island inhabited by about twenty households, and when asked why the three were discovered in separate locations, they informed the court that two—Zhang Wenxue and Li Shouzhang—had travelled with a tobacco-boat to the shore when the third—Gu Yilun—was too high up the mountain slope and had to take a separate boat to shore.<sup>85</sup> On this occasion, the Chosŏn court, perhaps fearing unnecessary trouble, avoided extending the discussion.

Both with Yu and with the Shandong boatmen, the islanders of Chido spent a considerable period of time caring autonomously for the castaways while making little reference to the demands of the Chosŏn state. It is quite likely that the islanders felt some fellow feeling for the castaways. Many islanders had ancestors who had moved from the mainland before settlement was formally approved by the state,<sup>86</sup> and the region itself had only recently gained a formal garrison. Although it may well be true that the Shandong castaways quite genuinely did not remember the name of the village in which they initially took shelter, it is also possible that they repaid the kindness of the islanders with a corresponding refusal to betray the islanders to the Chosŏn court—and indeed, there is abundant evidence for such cross-border solidarity in the case of other frontiers.<sup>87</sup> Fewer details survive concerning the activities of Yu than concerning the Shandong boatman, and it is not possible, on the basis of the surviving evidence, to date Yu's arrival on the island. However, in one of his interrogations he claimed that he was able to take shelter with an elderly islander named Pak Ip in exchange for a valuable sword gifted to Pak by Gao Ziyong. At the time the Chosŏn court expressed considerable anger at this act, saying of Pak Ip that:

The one called Pak Ip must have no fear of the kingdom's laws that he would privately deal with a man from another kingdom without reporting it to an official, and even accept a bribe. This is most shocking, and must be investigated with the utmost concern. Only upon a careful investigation of all twists and turns of his time on the island, and after an accurate distinction is made between truth and falsehood, may we settle the matter of this commoner.

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<sup>85</sup> *Pibyŏnsa t'angnok* 38:37a–42b [1684.2.30].

<sup>86</sup> See Kim Kyŏngok, 75–84, for the illegal nature of much initial settlement of the islands before the establishment of garrisons under Sukchong.

<sup>87</sup> For cross-border fraternization in the case of the Japan House in Tongnae, see Lewis, *Frontier Contact*, 192–209.

The result, of course, was the interrogation of Pak Ip.<sup>88</sup>

Seemingly, at least, Pak Ip's father had sheltered a castaway. Pak Ip, despite Yu Yölli's description, turned out to be a young man. He denied the bribe of a sword, but confirmed that three starving foreigners had arrived on the island, that his father had put up one of them for the night and provided food, and that the three had wandered about the island, returning again ten days later and then disappearing without a trace. But Pak Ip referred not to people from Fujian but from Dengzhou, suggesting to the interrogators that he was actually referring to the three Shandong sailors who had been shipwrecked there in 1684.<sup>89</sup> Was the starving Chinese mentioned by Pak Ip in fact Yu, or was he one of the three Shandong sailors later returned? If he was Yu, how much of what Yu said about his interaction with Pak's family was true, and how much of Pak's version of events was motivated primarily by a desire to avoid the most serious of accusations? While these questions are now difficult to answer, at the very least the interaction suggests the limits of the Chosŏn state in controlling contact between castaways and Korean islanders. Both the Shandong castaways discovered in 1684 and Yu in 1687 had survived by begging from local people for a long time before they were discovered by the authorities. The Shandong castaways had even made their own way through coastal trading boats before they came to the attention of the court. Yu, seemingly, was fraudulently exploiting a tolerance for ambiguity and fellow feeling among borderland people.

Yu Yölli, an otherwise anonymous inhabitant of Honam, was discovered in the chaotic world of the southwestern islands. This was a world over which the Chosŏn court under Sukchong sought to achieve control. It was an area of marginal subjects that also received a significant number of castaways from Japan, China and elsewhere. The many security risks associated with the islands explain why the Chosŏn court took the case so seriously, but they also explain in part the difficulty that the Chosŏn court had in clarifying the incident. The islands, although formerly under Chosŏn control, were inhabited by people whose lives must have been substantially alien to central court officials, and indeed not only Yu Yölli but Zhang Wenxue and crew had survived on islands without encountering any organ of the Chosŏn state for several months.

## 5. CONCLUSION

Although there was no direct reference to the event of 1667, an obscure swindler

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<sup>88</sup> *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 41:41b [1687.5.9]: “所謂朴立，不畏國法，私自接置異國之人，不告官家，至受賂物，事極痛駭，不可不重究。而其間曲折，爲先查問，知其情僞，然後此漢可以處置。”

<sup>89</sup> *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* 41:55a [1687.5.27].

in Chōlla was aware enough of court worries concerning the Zheng family, and court debates concerning to the repatriation of Lin Yinguan's crew, to produce an image of a Ming castaway that closely approximated the elite fantasy of a Ming Loyalist migrant. To the modern reader, it seems extraordinary that the Border Defence Command left open as long as it did the possibility that Yu was telling the truth. At times it seems as if the investigators were deliberately avoiding coming to the obvious conclusions.

What can we learn from Yu's lies? Why were his lies so successful for so long, and what does this tell us about Chosŏn society of the late seventeenth century? To a certain extent, the confusion concerning Yu Yōlli may have been caused simply by bureaucratic miscommunication. The different actors within the bureaucracy, including the monarch, high court officials, the governor of Chōlla province, and the interpreters, as well as the numerous other bureaucratic agents who do not now appear clearly within the sources, may not have succeeded in sharing information concerning Yu with each other.

Yet this can only explain part of the delay in establishing the false nature of his claims. On the one hand, the Chosŏn court was invested in many of the same lies that Yu himself produced. The Chosŏn court, despite its ostensible Ming Loyalism, did not provide any practical military support to the Ming empire or successor states in the period after 1637. All forms of southern Ming resistance were forced to contend without any Chosŏn support at all, and it is by no means clear that the Chosŏn court would have been interested in supporting Ming remnants even if it had been possible to do so. This reality, however, could never be openly expressed in the politically-charged atmosphere of the late seventeenth century. Moreover, the Chosŏn court and elites could only interact with the Ming court through rumours passed to the Chosŏn court frequently through unreliable and unofficial channels, notably including castaways and frontier peoples. The Chosŏn court, lacking good information concerning southern and maritime China (which was, after all, a linguistically diverse region), and only weakly in control of its southwestern islands, had few tools by which to evaluate the reality of the claims made by Yu Yōlli.

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